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Abstract
Transactional memory (TM) facilitates the development of concurrent applications by letting the
programmer designate certain code blocks as atomic. Programmers using a TM often would like to
access the same data both inside and outside transactions, and would prefer their programs to have
a strongly atomic semantics, which allows transactions to be viewed as executing atomically with
respect to non-transactional accesses. Since guaranteeing such semantics for arbitrary programs is
prohibitively expensive, researchers have suggested guaranteeing it only for certain data-race free
(DRF) programs, particularly those that follow the privatization idiom: from some point on, threads
agree that a given object can be accessed non-transactionally.
In this paper we show that a variant of Transactional DRF (TDRF) by Dalessandro et al. is
appropriate for a class of privatization-safe TMs, which allow using privatization idioms. We prove
that, if such a TM satisfies a condition we call privatization-safe opacity and a program using the
TM is TDRF under strongly atomic semantics, then the program indeed has such semantics. We
also present a method for proving privatization-safe opacity that reduces proving this generalization
to proving the usual opacity, and apply the method to a TM based on two-phase locking and a
privatization-safe version of TL2. Finally, we establish the inherent cost of privatization-safety: we
prove that a TM cannot be progressive and have invisible reads if it guarantees strongly atomic
semantics for TDRF programs.
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1 Introduction
Transactional memory (TM) facilitates the development of concurrent applications by letting
the programmer designate certain code blocks as atomic [23]. TM allows developing a
program and reasoning about its correctness as if each atomic block executes as a transaction—
atomically and without interleaving with other blocks—even though in reality the blocks can
be executed concurrently. A TM can be implemented in hardware [24, 28], software [33] or a
combination of both [13, 27].
Often programmers using a TM would like to access the same data both inside and
outside transactions. This may be desirable to avoid performance overheads of transactional
accesses, to support legacy code, or for explicit memory deallocation. One typical pattern
is privatization [30, 34], illustrated in Figure 1. There the atomic blocks return a value
signifying whether the transaction committed or aborted. In the program, an object x is
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2 Privatization-Safe Transactional Memories
{ priv = false · x = 0 }
l1 = atomic {
priv = true; } //T1
if (l1 == committed)
x = 1; //n
atomic {
if (!priv)
x = 42;
} //T2
{ l1 = committed =∆ x = 1 }
Figure 1 Privatization.
{ priv = true · x = l = 0 }
x = 42; //n
l1 = atomic {
priv = false;
} //T1
l2 = atomic {
if (!priv)
l = x;
} // T2
{ l2 = committed · l ”= 0 =∆ l = 42 }
Figure 2 Publication.
{ x = y = 0 }
atomic {
x = 1;
y = 2;
} //T
l1 = x; //n1
l2 = y; //n2
{ l1 = 1 =∆ l2 = 2 }
Figure 3 Data race.
guarded by a flag priv, showing whether the object should be accessed transactionally (false)
or non-transactionally (true). The left-hand-side thread first tries to set the flag inside
transaction T1, thereby privatizing x. If successful, it then accesses x non-transactionally.
A concurrent transaction T2 in the right-hand-side thread checks the flag priv prior to
accessing x, to avoid simultaneous transactional and non-transactional access to the object.
We expect the postcondition shown to hold: if privatization is successful, at the end of
the program x should store 1, not 42. The opposite idiom is publication, illustrated in
Figure 2. The left-hand-side thread writes to x non-transactionally and then clears the flag
priv inside transaction T1, thereby publishing x. The right-hand-side thread tests the flag
inside transaction T2, and if it is cleared, reads x. Again, we expect the postcondition to
hold: if the right-hand-side thread sees the write to the flag, it should also see the write to x.
The two idioms can be combined: the programmer may privatize an object, then access it
non-transactionally, and finally publish it back for transactional access.
Ideally, programmers mixing transactional and non-transactional accesses to objects
would like their programs to have strongly atomic semantics [8], where transactions can be
viewed as executing atomically also with respect to non-transactional accesses, i.e., without
interleaving with them. This is equivalent to considering every non-transactional access as a
single-instruction transaction. For example, the program in Figure 3 under strongly atomic
semantics can only produce executions where each of the non-transactional accesses n1 and
n2 executes either before or after the transaction T , so that the postcondition in Figure 3
always holds. Unfortunately, providing such semantics in software requires instrumenting
non-transactional accesses with additional instructions for maintaining TM metadata [19].
This undermines scalability and makes it di cult to reuse legacy code. Since most existing
TMs are either software-based or rely on a software fall-back, they do not perform such
instrumentation and, hence, provide weaker atomicity guarantees. For example, they may
allow the program in Figure 3 to execute non-transactional accesses n1 and n2 between
transactional writes to x and y and, thus, observe an intermediate state of the transaction,
e.g., x = 1 and y = 0, violating the postcondition in Figure 3.
Researchers have suggested resolving the tension between strong TM semantics and per-
formance by guaranteeing strongly atomic semantics only to data-race free (DRF) programs—
informally, programs without concurrent transactional and non-transactional accesses to
the same data [4, 5, 10, 11, 30, 32, 34]. For example, we do not have to guarantee strongly
atomic semantics for the program in Figure 3, which has such concurrent accesses to x and y.
On the other hand, the programs in Figure 1 and Figure 2 should be guaranteed strongly
atomic semantics, since at any point of time, an object is accessed either only transactionally
or only non-transactionally. Despite the intuitive simplicity of this idea, coming up with a
precise DRF definition is nontrivial: early on there were multiple competing proposals for the
notion of DRF, and it was unclear how to select among them [4, 10, 11, 25, 29]. To address
this, we have recently formalized the requirements on an appropriate notion of DRF using
observational refinement [26]: a TM needs to guarantee that, if a program is DRF under
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the strongly atomic semantics (formalized as transactional sequential consistency [11]), then
all its executions are observationally equivalent to strongly atomic ones. This Fundamental
Property allows the programmer to never reason about weakly atomic semantics at all, even
when checking DRF.
Di erent TMs have di erent requirements on mixing transactional and non-transactional
accesses needed to validate the Fundamental Property. Privatization-safe TMs, such as
lock-based TMs [15, 21] and NOrec [12], allow the programmer to ensure the absence
of concurrent transactional and non-transactional accesses by synchronizing them using
transactional operations. Then the program in Figure 1, which synchronizes accesses to x
using priv, is guaranteed strongly atomic semantics as is. Privatization-unsafe TMs, such as
TL2 [14] and TinySTM [16], require the programmer to insert additional synchronization, e.g.,
via transactional fences [30, 34], which block until all the transactions that were active when
the fence was invoked complete. For example, such TMs do not guarantee strongly atomic
semantics to the program in Figure 1 unless the transaction T1 is immediately followed by a
transactional fence. This is because TMs such as TL2 execute transactions optimistically,
flushing their writes to memory only on commit. Then, in the absence of a fence, the
transaction T1 can privatize x and n can modify it after T2 started committing, but before
its write to x reached the memory, so that T2’s write subsequently overwrites n’s write and
violates the postcondition. TMs that make transactional updates in-place and undo them on
abort are subject to a similar problem.
Privatization-safe TMs provide a simpler programming model, since they do not require
the programmer to select where to place fences. However, the programmer still needs to avoid
programs of the kind shown in Figure 3, which would lead the TM to violate strong atomicity.
In this paper we show that a variant of transactional DRF (TDRF) previously proposed by
Dalessandro et al. [11] is appropriate to formalize the programmer’s obligations. To this
end, we show that this variant of TDRF validates the Fundamental Property, provided the
TM satisfies a generalization of opacity [20, 21], which we call privatization-safe opacity. To
formulate this kind of opacity, we generalize TDRF to arbitrary TM histories, not just strongly
atomic ones. These results complement our previous proposal of DRF for privatization-unsafe
TMs, which considers a more low-level programming model requiring fence placements [26].
We furthermore present a method for proving privatization-safe opacity and apply it
to a TM based on two-phase locking [21] and a privatization-safe version of TL2 [14] that
executes a fence at the end of each transaction. A key feature of our method is that it reduces
proving privatization-safe opacity to proving the ordinary opacity of the TM assuming no
mixed transactional/non-transactional accesses. This allows us to reuse the previous proofs
of opacity of the two-phase locking TM [21] and TL2 [26].
Finally, our framework allows proving an interesting result about the inherent cost of
privatization-safety. We prove that a TM that provides strongly atomic semantics to TDRF
programs cannot be progressive and have invisible reads: it cannot ensure that transactions
always complete when running solo and also that transactions reading objects do not prevent
transactions writing to them from committing. This result significantly simplifies and
strengthens a lower bound by Attiya and Hillel [7], which did not use a formal DRF notion.
2 Programming Language and Strongly Atomic Semantics
Language syntax. We formalize our results for a simple programming language with mixed
transactional and non-transactional accesses. A program P = C1 Î . . . Î CN in our language
is a parallel composition of commands Ct executed by di erent threads t œ ThreadID =
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{1, . . . , N}. Every thread t œ ThreadID has a set of local variables l œ LVart, which only it
can access; for simplicity, we assume that these are integer-valued. Threads have access to
a transactional memory (TM), which manages a fixed collection of shared register objects
x œ Reg. The syntax of commands C œ Com is as follows:
C ::= c | C ; C | if (b) then C else C | while (b) do C
| l = atomic {C} | l = x.read() | x.write(e)
where b and e denote Boolean, respectively, integer expressions over local variables and
constants. The language includes primitive commands c œ PCom, which operate on local
variables, and standard control-flow constructs. An atomic block l = atomic {C} executes C
as a transaction, which the TM can commit or abort. The system’s decision is returned in the
local variable l, which receives a distinguished value committed or aborted. We do not allow
programs to abort a transaction explicitly and forbid nested atomic blocks. Threads can
invoke two methods on a register x: x.read() returns the current value of x, and x.write(e)
sets it to e. These methods may be invoked both inside and outside atomic blocks.
Model of computations. The semantics of our programming language is defined in terms
of traces—certain finite sequences of actions, each describing a single computation step (in
this paper we consider only finite computations). Let ActionId be a set of action identifiers.
Actions are of two kinds. A primitive action denotes the execution of a primitive command
and is of the form (a, t, c), where a œ ActionId, t œ ThreadID and c œ PCom. An interface
action has one of the following forms (where x œ Reg and v œ Z):
Request actions Matching response actions
(a, t, begintx) (a, t, ok) | (a, t, aborted)
(a, t, trycommit) (a, t, committed) | (a, t, aborted)
(a, t,write(x, v)) (a, t, ret(‹)) | (a, t, aborted)
(a, t, read(x)) (a, t, ret(v)) | (a, t, aborted)
Interface actions usually denote the control flow of a thread t crossing the boundary
between the program and the TM: request actions correspond to the control being transferred
from the former to the latter, and response actions, the other way around. A begintx action
is generated upon entering an atomic block, and a trycommit action when a transaction
tries to commit upon exiting an atomic block. The request actions write(x, v) and read(x)
denote invocations of the write, respectively, read methods of register x; a write action is
annotated with the value v written. The response actions ret(‹) and ret(v) denote the return
from invocations of write, respectively, read methods of a register; the latter is annotated
with the value v read. The TM may abort a transaction at any point when it is in control;
this is recorded by an aborted response action. To simplify notation, we reuse the interface
actions for reads and writes to denote accesses outside transactions.
A trace · is a finite sequence of actions satisfying the expected well-formedness conditions,
e.g., that request and response actions are properly matched, and so are actions denoting the
beginning and the end of transactions (we defer the formal definition to §A). A transaction T
is a nonempty trace such that it contains actions by the same thread, begins with a begintx
action and only its last action can be a committed or an aborted action. A transaction T is:
committed if it ends with a committed action, aborted if it ends with aborted, commit-pending
if it ends with trycommit, and live, in all other cases. A transaction T is in a trace · if T
is a subsequence of · and no longer transaction is. We refer to interface actions in a trace
outside of a transaction as non-transactional actions. We call a matching request/response
pair of a read or a write a non-transactional access (ranged over by n).
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A history is a trace containing only interface actions (thus, omitting all accesses to local
variables); we use H,S to range over histories, and H(i) to refer to the i-th action in H.
We also use history(·) to denote a projection of a trace to interface actions. Since histories
fully capture the possible interactions between a TM and a client program, we often conflate
the notion of a TM and the set of histories it produces. Hence, a transactional memory H
is a prefix-closed set of histories. We assume that a TM always allows a client program to
execute a request and, hence, require H to be closed under appending any request action
to its histories, provided that the latter remain well-formed. Note that histories include
actions corresponding to non-transactional accesses, even though these may not be directly
managed by the TM implementation. This is needed to account for changes to registers
performed by such actions when defining the TM semantics: e.g., in the case when a register
is privatized, modified non-transactionally and then published back for transactional access.
Of course, a well-formed TM semantics should not impose restrictions on the placement of
non-transactional actions, since these are under the control of the program.
Strongly atomic semantics. The semantics of a program P is given by the set JP K(H) of
traces it produces when executed with a TM H. Its formal definition follows the intuitive
meaning of commands, and we defer it to §A. Our semantics assumes that the underlying
memory is sequentially consistent, which allows us to focus on the key issues specific to TM
(we leave handling weak memory for future work, discussed in §9). We use the semantics
instantiated with one particular TM to define the strongly atomic semantics of programs [8],
which is equivalent to transactional sequential consistency [11]. Following [6], we use an
atomic TM Hatomic for this purpose: the strongly atomic semantics of a program P is given by
the set of traces JP K(Hatomic). The TMHatomic contains only histories that are non-interleaved,
i.e., where actions by one transaction do not overlap with actions of another transaction or
of non-transactional accesses. Out of such histories, Hatomic contains only histories following
the intuitive atomic semantics of transactions: every response action of a read(x) returns
the value v in the last preceding write(x, v) action that is not located in an aborted or live
transaction di erent from the one of the read; if there is no such write, the read returns the
initial value vinit. We defer a formal definition of Hatomic to §A.
3 Transactional Data-Race Freedom
We now formalize in our framework a variant of transactional data-race freedom (TDRF)
of Dalessandro et al. [11]. According to this notion, a data race happens between a pair of
conflicting actions, as defined below.
I Definition 1. A non-transactional request action – and a transactional request action –Õ
conflict if – and –Õ are executed by di erent threads, they are read or write actions on the
same register, and at least one of them is a write.
As is standard, we formalize when conflicting actions form a data race using a happens-
before relation hb(H) on actions in a history H. We first define the execution order of H as
follows: – <H –Õ i  for some i and j, – = H(i), –Õ = H(j) and i < j.
I Definition 2. The happens-before relation of a history H œ Hatomic is
hb(H) , (po(H) fi ef(H) fi cl(H))+, where
per-thread order po(H): – <po(H) –Õ i  – <H –Õ and –,–Õ are by the same thread;
e ect order ef(H): – <ef(H) –Õ i  – <H –Õ and –,–Õ are by di erent transactions;
client order cl(H): – <cl(H) –Õ i  – <H –Õ and –,–Õ are non-transactional in H.
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I Definition 3. A history H œ Hatomic is transactional data-race free, written TDRF(H), if
every pair of conflicting actions in it is ordered by hb(H) one way or another. A program P
is transactional data-race free, written TDRF(P ), if ’· œ JP K(Hatomic).TDRF(history(·)).
Components of happens-before used to define TDRF describe various forms of synchro-
nization available in our programming language. First, actions by the same thread cannot be
concurrent and thus we let po(H) ™ hb(H). Second, privatization-safe TMs provide synchro-
nization between transactions, which follows their order in non-interleaved histories of an
atomic TM considered in the definition of TDRF on programs. Thus, we let ef(H) ™ hb(H).
Finally, we let cl(H) ™ hb(H), because in this paper we assume a sequentially consistent
memory model and, hence, do not consider pairs of conflicting non-transactional accesses as
races. This is the key di erence between our variant of TDRF and the original definition by
Dalessandro et al. [11], which does not include the client order into happens-before. Our
variant of TDRF imposes fewer obligations on the programmer: as we show by establishing
the Fundamental Property for our variant of TDRF (§5), under sequentially consistent
memory races on non-transactional accesses are harmless for privatization-safety.
To illustrate the TDRF definition, we show that the program in Figure 1 is TDRF by
considering the histories it produces with the atomic TM (the program in Figure 2 can be
shown TDRF analogously). The possible conflicts are between the accesses to x in n and T2.
For a conflict to occur, T2 has to read false from priv; then T2 has to execute before T1,
yielding a history of the form T2T1n. In this history T2 precedes T1 in the e ect order and
T1 precedes n in the per-thread order, meaning that hb(H) orders the conflict between T2
and n. Similarly, in §B we show that programs following a proxy privatization pattern [36],
where one thread privatizes an object for another thread, are also TDRF. On the other hand,
the program in Figure 3 is not TDRF, since in histories it produces with the atomic TM,
the happens-before never relates T with n1 and n2. Finally, the inclusion of cl(H) ™ hb(H)
allows us to consider DRF those programs that privatize an object by agreeing on its status
outside transactions (“partitioning by consensus” in [34]); we provide an example in §B.
4 Privatization-Safe Opacity
We now present our first contribution—a generalization of opacity of a TM H [20, 21] that
guarantees that the TM provides strongly atomic semantics to TDRF programs. We call this
generalization privatization-safe opacity. Its definition requires that a history H of a TM H
can be matched by a history S of the atomic TM Hatomic that “looks similar” to H from the
perspective of the program. The similarity is formalized by a relation H ı S, which requires
S to be a permutation of H preserving its per-thread and client orders.
I Definition 4. A history H1 corresponds to a history H2, written H1 ı H2, if there is a
bijection ◊ : {1, . . . , |H1|}æ {1, . . . , |H2|} such that ’i.H1(i) = H2(◊(i)) and
’i, j. i < j ·H1(i) <po(H1)ficl(H1) H2(j) =∆ ◊(i) < ◊(j).
The above relation di ers in several ways from the one used to define the ordinary opacity.
First, unlike in the ordinary opacity, our histories include non-transactional actions, because
these can a ect the behavior of the TM. Second, instead of preserving cl(H1) in Definition 4,
the ordinary opacity requires preserving the following real-time order rt(H1) on actions:
– <rt(H) –
Õ i  – œ {(_,_, committed), (_,_, aborted)}, –Õ = (_,_, begintx) and – <H –Õ.
This orders non-overlapping transactions, with the duration of a transaction determined by
the interval from its begintx action to the corresponding committed or aborted action (or to
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the end of the history if there is none). However, preserving real-time order is unnecessary if
all means of communication between program threads are reflected in histories [17].
We next lift privatization-safe opacity to TMs. A straightforward definition, mirroring
the ordinary opacity, would require any history of the TM H to have a matching history of
the atomic TM Hatomic. However, such a requirement would be too strong for our setting:
since the TM has no control over non-transactional actions of its clients, histories in H may
be produced by racy programs, and we do not want to require the TM to guarantee strong
atomicity in such cases. For example, even though a simple TM based on a single global lock
is privatization-safe, it has a history produced by the program from Figure 3 that does not
have a matching history of Hatomic (§1). Hence, our definition of privatization-safe opacity
requires only histories produced by TDRF programs to have justifications in Hatomic. To
express this restriction, we generalize data-race freedom to be defined over an arbitrary
concurrent history H, not just one produced by Hatomic. The new DRF requires that every
history of the atomic TM matching H according to the opacity relation be TDRF.
I Definition 5. A history H œ H is concurrent data-race free, written CDRF(H), if ’S œ
Hatomic. H ı S =∆ TDRF(S). Let H|CDRF = {H œ H | CDRF(H)}. A program P is concur-
rent data-race free with a TM H, written CDRF(P,H), if ’· œ JP K(H).CDRF(history(·)).
I Definition 6. A TM H is privatization-safe opaque, written H|CDRF ı Hatomic, if for every
history H œ H|CDRF there exists a history S œ Hatomic such that H ı S holds.
The following lemma (proved in §C) justifies using CDRF as a generalization of TDRF to
concurrent histories by establishing that TDRF programs indeed produce CDRF histories.
I Lemma 7. For every program P and a TM system H, TDRF(P ) implies CDRF(P,H).
5 The Fundamental Property
We next formalize the Fundamental Property of TDRF using observational refinement [6]: if
a program is TDRF under the atomic TM Hatomic, then any trace of the program under a
privatization-safe opaque TM H has an observationally equivalent trace under Hatomic.
I Definition 8. Traces · and · Õ are observationally equivalent, denoted by · ≥ · Õ, if
’t. · |t = · Õ|t and · |nontx = · Õ|nontx, where · |nontx denotes the subsequence of · containing all
actions from non-transactional accesses.
Equivalent traces are considered indistinguishable to the user. In particular, the sequences
of non-transactional accesses in equivalent traces (which usually include all I/O) satisfy the
same linear-time temporal properties. We lift the equivalence to sets of traces as follows.
I Definition 9. A set of traces T observationally refines a set of traces T Õ, written T ∞ T Õ,
if ’· œ T .÷· Õ œ T Õ. · ≥ · Õ.
I Theorem 10 (Fundamental Property). If H is a TM such that H|CDRF ı Hatomic and P is
a program such that TDRF(P ), then JP K(H) ∞ JP K(Hatomic).
Theorem 10 establishes a contract between the programmer and the TM implementors. The
TM implementor has to ensure privatization-safe opacity of the TM assuming the program
is DRF: H|CDRF ı Hatomic. The programmer has to ensure the DRF of the program under
strongly atomic semantics: TDRF(P ). This contract lets the programmer check properties of
a program assuming strongly atomic semantics (JP K(Hatomic)) and get the guarantee that the
properties hold when the program uses the actual TM implementation (JP K(H)). Theorem 10
follows from Lemma 7 and the next lemma, which is an adaptation of a result from [6].
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I Lemma 11. If H is a TM such that H|CDRF ı Hatomic, then ’P.CDRF(P,H) =∆JP K(H) ∞ JP K(Hatomic).
6 Proving Privatization-Safe Opacity
We now develop a method that reduces proving privatization-safe opacity (H|CDRF ı Hatomic)
to proving the ordinary opacity. The method builds on a graph characterization of opacity
by Guerraoui and Kapalka [21], which was proposed for proving opacity of TMs that do not
allow mixed transactional/non-transactional accesses to the same data. The characterization
allows checking opacity of a history H by checking two properties: consistency of the history,
denoted cons(H), and the acyclicity of a certain opacity graph, which we define in the
following. Consistency is a basic well-formedness property of a history ensuring the following.
If a transaction T in H reads a value of a register x and writes to it before, then T reads the
latest value it writes. If T reads a value of x and does not write to it before, then it reads
some value written non-transactionally or by a committed or commit-pending transaction
(or the initial value, when everything else fails). Consistency also ensures that only the last
write to x by a transaction is read from. We define consistency formally in §D and focus
here on defining opacity graphs.
The vertexes in these graphs include transactions and non-transactional accesses in H.
The intention of the vis predicate below is to mark those vertexes that have taken e ect,
including commit-pending transactions of this kind. The other components, intuitively,
constrain the order in which the vertexes should appear in the atomic history.
I Definition 12. The opacity graph of a history H is a tuple
G = (V, vis,WR,WW,RW,PO,CL), where:
V is the set of graph vertexes, i.e., all transactions and non-transactional accesses from
H (ranged over by ‹).
vis ™ V is a visibility predicate, which holds of all non-transactional accesses and com-
mitted transactions and does not hold of all aborted and live transactions.
WR : Regæ 2V◊V specifies per-register read-dependency relations on vertexes, such that
For each read dependency ‹ WRx≠≠≠æ‹Õ, we have that ‹ ”= ‹Õ, ‹ contains (_,_,write(x, v)),
and ‹Õ contains a request (_,_, read(x)) and a matching response (_,_, ret(v)).
Each vertex that reads x has at most one corresponding read dependency:
’‹, ‹Õ, ‹ÕÕ, x. ‹ WRx≠≠≠æ ‹Õ · ‹ÕÕ WRx≠≠≠æ ‹ =∆ ‹ = ‹ÕÕ.
Each vertex that is read from is visible: ’‹, x. ‹ WRx≠≠≠æ_ =∆ vis(‹).
Informally, ‹ WRx≠≠≠æ ‹Õ means that ‹Õ reads what ‹ wrote to x.
WW : Regæ 2V◊V specifies per-register write-dependency relations, such that for each
x œ Reg, WWx is an irreflexive total order on {‹ œ V | vis(‹) · (_,_,write(x,_)) œ ‹}.
Informally, ‹ WWx≠≠≠æ ‹Õ means that ‹Õ overwrites what ‹ wrote to x.
RW œ Regæ 2V◊V specifies per-register anti-dependency relations:
‹
RWx≠≠≠æ ‹Õ ≈∆ ‹ ”= ‹Õ · ((÷‹ÕÕ. ‹ÕÕ WWx≠≠≠æ ‹Õ · ‹ÕÕ WRx≠≠≠æ ‹) ‚
(vis(‹Õ) · (_,_,write(x,_)) œ ‹Õ · (_,_, ret(x, vinit)) œ ‹)).
Informally, ‹ RWx≠≠≠æ ‹Õ means that ‹Õ overwrites the write to x that ‹ previously read (the
initial value of x is overwritten by any write to x).
PO,CL œ 2V◊V are the per-thread and client orders lifted to pairs of graph vertexes: e.g.,
‹
PO(H)≠≠≠≠æ ‹Õ ≈∆ ÷– œ ‹,–Õ œ ‹Õ.– <po(H) –Õ.
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We let Graph(H) denote the set of all opacity graphs of H. We say that a graph G is
acyclic, written acyclic(G), if its edges do not form a directed cycle. We also refer to histories
resulting from topological sortings of vertexes in a graph G as its linearizations and denote
their set by lins(G). The next lemma shows that we can check privatization-safe opacity
of a history by checking its consistency and the acyclicity of its opacity graph, with any
linearization of the graph yielding a matching atomic history.
I Lemma 13. ’H. (cons(H) · ÷G œ Graph(H). acyclic(G)) =∆ lins(G) ™ Hatomic.
The lemma is proven analogously to Lemma 6.4 in [26, §B.2]. It implies the following theorem,
which gives a criterion for the privatization-safe opacity of a TM H.
I Theorem 14. H ı Hatomic holds if ’H œ H. cons(H) · ÷G œ Graph(H). acyclic(G).
In comparison to the graph characterization of the ordinary opacity [21], ours is more
complex: the graph includes non-transactional accesses and the acyclicity check has to take
into account paths involving them. We now formulate lemmas that simplify reasoning about
non-transactional operations: they allow proving the privatization-safe opacity of a TM
using Theorem 14 with only small adjustments to a proof of its ordinary opacity using
graph characterization. The latter characterization includes only transactions as nodes of
the graph, but additionally considers paths including the lifting of the real-time order from
§4 to transactions: for a history H, we let RT(H) be the relation between transactions in
H such that T <RT(H) T Õ i  for some – œ T and –Õ œ T we have – <rt(H) –Õ. We also let
DEP denote any edge in a given graph G, and we let txDEP denote an edge between two
transactions.
The following lemma exploits CDRF to show that, for every path between two transactions
in an acyclic opacity graph, there is another path replacing edges involving non-transactional
accesses by real-time order edges or transactional dependencies.
I Lemma 15. Consider an acyclic opacity graph G = (V, vis,WR,WW,RW,PO,CL) of
a consistent CDRF history H. For any two transactions T and T Õ, if T DEP≠≠æú T Õ, then
T
RTfitxDEP≠≠≠≠≠≠æú T Õ.
The next lemma exploits CDRF to show that, for every path between a transaction and a
non-transactional access in an acyclic opacity graph, there is another path where per-thread
order is the only kind of an edge between transactions and non-transactional accesses.
I Lemma 16. Consider an acyclic opacity graph G = (V, vis,WR,WW,RW,PO,CL) of a
CDRF history H. For any transaction T and non-transactional access n:
if T DEP≠≠æú n, then there are T Õ and nÕ such that T RTfitxDEP≠≠≠≠≠≠æú T Õ PO≠≠æ nÕ CL≠æú n;
if n DEP≠≠æú T , then there are T Õ and nÕ such that n CL≠æú nÕ PO≠≠æ T Õ RTfitxDEP≠≠≠≠≠≠æú T .
Our method for proving the privatization-safe opacity of a TM (which we illustrate in §7)
uses Lemmas 15 and 16 to reduce proving the acyclicity of an opacity graph to proving the
absence of cycles in the projection of the graph to transactions, enriched with real-time order
edges. The simplified acyclicity check is exactly the one required in the graph characterization
of the ordinary opacity [21], allowing us to reuse existing proofs.
In the following we prove Lemmas 15 and 16. We show the existence of the paths required
in the lemmas by using CDRF to eliminate WR/WW/RW-dependencies between transactions
and non-transactional accesses. Each of the dependencies to be eliminated corresponds to a
conflict in a matching atomic history, which CDRF guarantees to relate by happens-before.
The next lemma exploits this observation.
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I Lemma 17. Consider an acyclic opacity graph G = (V, vis,WR,WW,RW,PO,CL) of a
consistent CDRF history H. For any transaction T and non-transactional access n:
1. if T DEP≠≠æ n, then there are T Õ and nÕ such that T DEP≠≠æú T Õ PO≠≠æ nÕ CL≠æú n;
2. if n DEP≠≠æ T , then there are T Õ and nÕ such that n CL≠æú nÕ PO≠≠æ T Õ DEP≠≠æú T .
For example, consider an execution of the program in Figure 1 where T2 reads false
from priv and writes to x before n does. The corresponding acyclic graph contains both
T2
WWx≠≠≠æ n and T2 RWpriv≠≠≠≠æ T1 PO≠≠æ n. To prove Lemma 17, we lift <po(H), <ef(H), <cl(H) and
<hb(H) from Definition 2 to vertexes of the graph as expected, writing <PO(H), <EF(H),
<CL(H) and <HB(H) for the resulting relations. We also write Æ for their reflexive closure.
We rely on the following easy result (proved in §D).
I Proposition 18. In a TDRF history H, for any T and n we have:
if T <HB(H) n, then there are T Õ and nÕ such that T ÆEF(H) T Õ <PO(H) nÕ ÆCL(H) n;
if n <HB(H) T , then there are T Õ and nÕ such that n ÆCL(H) nÕ <PO(H) T Õ ÆEF(H) T .
Proof of Lemma 17. We only prove part 1, as part 2 can be proven analogously. Assume
T
DEP≠≠æ n. If T PO≠≠æ n, then T DEP≠≠æú T PO≠≠æ n CL≠æú n, which trivially concludes the proof. In
the following, we consider the remaining case when ¬(T PO≠≠æn) and T WRfiRWfiWW≠≠≠≠≠≠≠≠≠æn, so that
T and n contain conflicting actions. Let A denote the following set of pairs (T Õ, nÕ) of a
transaction and a non-transactional access:
A , {(T Õ, nÕ) | ÷L œ lins(G). T ÆEF(L) T Õ <PO(L) nÕ ÆCL(L) n}.
By Definition 12, for any (T Õ, nÕ) œ A we have T Õ PO≠≠æ nÕ CL≠æú n. It su ces to show that
there is T Õ such that T DEP≠≠æú T Õ and (T Õ,_) œ A. Proceeding by contradiction, let us
assume that this is not the case: for every (T Õ,_) œ A, there is no edge T DEP≠≠æú T Õ in G.
Then extending the graph with edges {T Õ DEP≠≠æ T | (T Õ,_) œ A} will not introduce a cycle.
Hence, there exists a linearization L œ lins(G) in which every (T Õ,_) œ A occurs before T :
’T Õ. (T Õ,_) œ A =∆ T Õ <EF(L) T .
Since, the history H is consistent and has an acyclic opacity graph G, by Lemma 13 we
get L œ lins(G) ™ Hatomic. Since H is CDRF, the conflicting pair T and n are ordered by
HB(L). Moreover, since T occurs before n in L and HB(L) is consistent with the execution
order of L, we have T <HB(L) n. From this by Proposition 18, for some T ÕÕ and nÕÕ we
have T ÆEF(L) T ÕÕ <PO(L) nÕÕ ÆCL(L) n. Hence, T ÆEF(L) T ÕÕ and (T ÕÕ, nÕÕ) œ A. But by the
construction of L we have T ÕÕ <EF(L) T , which contradicts the definition of ef as a total order
on transactions. This contradiction demonstrates the required. J
The following result leverages Lemma 17 to show that, for every path between two
transactions in an acyclic opacity graph, there is another path replacing some edges involving
non-transactional accesses by real-time order edges or transactional dependencies.
I Lemma 19. Consider an acyclic opacity graph G = (V, vis,WR,WW,RW,PO,CL) of a
consistent CDRF history H. For any two transactions T and T Õ, if T DEP≠≠æ+ T Õ, then there
are two transactions T1 and T2 such that T DEP≠≠æú T1 txDEPfiRT≠≠≠≠≠≠æ T2 DEP≠≠æú T Õ.
Proof. Assume T DEP≠≠æ+ T Õ and consider the corresponding path in the graph G. If there are
no non-transactional accesses on this path, then T txDEP≠≠≠≠æ+ T Õ, so the lemma holds trivially.
Assume now that there are non-transactional accesses on the path corresponding to
T
DEP≠≠æ+ T Õ. Let n and nÕ be the first and the last such accesses respectively, and also let
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T Õ1 (T Õ2) be the transaction immediately preceding n (following nÕ) on the path. Since G
is acyclic and CL relates every pair of non-transactional accesses, we must have n CL≠æú nÕ.
Then T DEP≠≠æú T Õ1 DEP≠≠æ n CL≠æú nÕ DEP≠≠æ T Õ2 DEP≠≠æú T Õ. Applying Lemma 17(1) to T Õ1 DEP≠≠æ n and
Lemma 17(2) to nÕ DEP≠≠æ T Õ2, we get that there are T1, n1, T2 and n2 such that:
T
DEP≠≠æú T Õ1 DEP≠≠æú T1 PO≠≠æ n1 CL≠æú n CL≠æú nÕ CL≠æ n2 PO≠≠æ T2 DEP≠≠æú T Õ2 DEP≠≠æú T Õ.
Then T DEP≠≠æú T1 PO≠≠æ n1 CL≠æú n2 PO≠≠æ T2 DEP≠≠æú T Õ. By Definition 12 of PO and CL, T1 ends
before T2 starts, so that T1 RT≠≠æ T2. Then T DEP≠≠æú T1 RT≠≠æ T2 DEP≠≠æú T Õ, as required. J
Proof of Lemma 15. To prove the lemma, we iteratively construct a path inG demonstrating
that T RTfitxDEP≠≠≠≠≠≠æú T Õ. At the k-th iteration we construct a sequence fik of transactions
T0, T Õ0, T1, T Õ1, . . . , Tk, T Õk œ V such that:
T0 = T , T Õk = T Õ, and
T0
DEP≠≠æú T Õ0 RTfitxDEP≠≠≠≠≠≠æ T1 DEP≠≠æú T Õ1 RTfitxDEP≠≠≠≠≠≠æ . . . RTfitxDEP≠≠≠≠≠≠æ Tk DEP≠≠æú T Õk.
We start the construction with a sequence fi0 = T, T Õ, which satisfies the above conditions
because T DEP≠≠æú T Õ. We stop the construction once we get a sequence fik such that Ti = T Õi
for each i = 0..k: in this case the sequence yields a path of the required form. Otherwise, we
construct fik+1 from fik as follows. We choose any two transactions Ti and T Õi in fik such that
Ti ”= T Õi and, hence, Ti DEP≠≠æ+ T Õi . By Lemma 19, there are T ÕÕi and T ÕÕÕi such that Ti DEP≠≠æú
T ÕÕi
txDEPfiRT≠≠≠≠≠≠æ T ÕÕÕi DEP≠≠æú T Õi . Then we let fik+1 = T0, T Õ0, . . . , Ti, T ÕÕi , T ÕÕÕi , T Õi , . . . , Tk, T Õk.
Since G is acyclic, in any fik the only transactions that can coincide are some consecutive
Ti and T Õi . Thus, fik contains at least k+1 distinct transactions. But then our transformation
has to stop after at most n steps, where n is the number of transactions in G. J
Proof of Lemma 16. We only prove part 1, as part 2 can be proven analogously. Assume
T
DEP≠≠æú n. Then there are T ÕÕ and nÕÕ such that T DEP≠≠æú T ÕÕ DEP≠≠æ nÕÕ DEP≠≠æú n. By Lemma 17,
there are T Õ and nÕ such that T DEP≠≠æú T ÕÕ DEP≠≠æú T Õ PO≠≠æ nÕ CL≠æú nÕÕ CL≠æú n. Then T DEP≠≠æú
T Õ PO≠≠æ nÕ CL≠æú n. By Lemma 15, T RTfitxDEP≠≠≠≠≠≠æú T Õ, implying the required. J
As we show in §D, the observations in the proofs of the Lemmas 15 and 16 additionally
let us establish the following interesting theorem, giving an equivalent formulation of CDRF
in terms of dependencies between transactions.
I Theorem 20. Given a consistent history H, CDRF(H) holds if and only if in each acyclic
opacity graph G = (V, vis,WR,WW,RW,PO,CL) œ Graph(H) there is a path over edges from
PO fi CL fi txDEP fi RT(H) between every pair of vertexes containing conflicting actions.
7 Case Study: FencedTL2
In this section we illustrate how Lemmas 15 and 16 enable simple proofs of privatization-safe
opacity using an example of a privatization-safe version of TL2 [14]. We give only the key
parts of the proof and defer details to §E. There we also give a proof of privatization-safe
opacity of a TM based on two-phase locking [21], which is privatization-safe.
As we noted in §1, the TL2 algorithm by itself is not privatization-safe. The reason is
that TL2 executes transactions optimistically, bu ering their writes, and flushes them to
memory only on commit. Thus, in the example in Figure 1, it is possible for the transaction
T1 to privatize x and for n to modify it after T2 started committing, but before its write to x
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reached the memory, so that T2’s write subsequently overwrites n’s write and violates the
postcondition. We can make TL2 privatization-safe by modifying its implementation so that
it executes a transactional fence [30, 34] at the end of every transaction, an implementation
we call FencedTL2. The fence has a semantics similar to Read-Copy-Update (RCU) [31]: it
blocks until all the concurrent transactions that were active when the fence was invoked
complete, by either committing or aborting. For instance, in the example in Figure 1
executing a transactional fence after T1 would block the thread until T2 commits or aborts,
thus ensuring that n is not overwritten by T2’s bu ered write. The above way of making a
TM privatization-safe is used in the GCC compiler [18] (albeit with TinySTM [16] instead of
TL2) and has been experimentally evaluated in [35, 36].
To prove privatization-safe opacity of FencedTL2, for every one of its executions we
inductively construct an opacity graph (with added real-time order edges) that matches its
history. This is done with the help of the following graph updates, which specify how and
when in the execution to extend the graph:
At the start of a transaction T , a graph update txinit(T ) adds a new vertex T and
extends the real-time order with edges T Õ RT≠≠æ T for every completed transaction T Õ.
At the end of a read operation of a transaction T reading from an object x, a graph
update txread(T, x) adds a read dependency ‹ WRx≠≠≠æT , where ‹ is the vertex that wrote
the value returned by the read.
During the commit of a transaction T , TL2 validates the consistency of T ’s read-set before
flushing T ’s write-set into memory. At the last step of the validation, a graph update
txwrite(T, x) adds a write dependency ‹ WWx≠≠≠æ T for every object x in the write-set of
T , where ‹ is the vertex that wrote the previous value of x.
Upon each non-transactional write n to an object x, a graph update ntxwrite(n, x)
adds a new vertex n and a write-dependency ‹ WWx≠≠≠æ n, where ‹ is the vertex that wrote
the previous value of x.
Upon each non-transactional read n from an object x, a graph update ntxread(n, x)
adds a new vertex n and a read dependency ‹ WRx≠≠≠æ n, where ‹ is the vertex that wrote
the value returned by n.
The updates also add anti-dependencies of the form _ RW≠≠æ T induced by new read- and
write-dependencies.
At each step of the graph construction we prove that the graph remains acyclic. Then
Theorem 14 guarantees that the history of the execution is opaque. We use Lemmas 15
and 16 to reduce the task of proving the graph acyclicity to proving the absence of cycles
involving transactions only. To discharge the latter proof obligation, we reuse our previous
proof of opacity of TL2 [26], also done via the graph characterization. This proof establishes
the following invariant over pairs (H,G) of a history H and a graph G:
INV1: H is a consistent history and the relation txDEP fi RT is acyclic.
To enable the reduction from privatization-safe to ordinary opacity, we prove the following
invariant, which states the guarantee provided by fences in FencedTL2:
INV2: For every uncompleted transaction T and a transaction T Õ, T txDEP≠≠≠≠æú T Õ PO≠≠æ_
does not hold.
An informal justification of INV2 is as follows. By construction of the graph it is possible
to establish that T Õ can depend on an uncompleted transaction T only when they execute
concurrently. In this case, the fence of T Õ will wait for T to commit or abort, and until then
there cannot be any transactions or non-transactional accesses in the thread of T Õ later in
the per-thread order. By Theorem 14, privatization-safe opacity of FencedTL2 follows from
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I Theorem 21. ’H œ FencedTL2.CDRF(H) =∆ ÷G. (H,G) œ INV1 · INV2 · acyclic(G).
We prove Theorem 21 by induction on the length of the TM execution inducing H, construct-
ing G as described above and showing that it remains acyclic after each update with the aid
of the two invariants. Due to space constraints, we only explain how we prove acyclicity in
the case of a graph update txwrite, which illustrates the use of Lemmas 15 and 16.
I Lemma 22. Let (H Õ, GÕ) be the result of performing an update txwrite(T, x) on (H,G).
Assume that (H,G), (H Õ, GÕ) œ INV1 · INV2 and G is acyclic. Then GÕ is acyclic too.
Proof. By contrapositive: we assume that GÕ contains a simple cycle and show that GÕ
violates either INV1 or INV2. The graph update adds an edge of the form _ WWx≠≠≠æ T and the
derived edges of the form _ RWx≠≠≠æ T . Since both kinds of edges end in the same vertex T ,
they cannot occur in the same simple cycle. Hence, we can consider them separately.
Consider a simple cycle involving a new edge ‹ DEP≠≠æ T for some vertex ‹. By our
assumption, there must be a reverse path T DEP≠≠æú ‹ in G. Let us first consider the case when
‹ is a transaction T Õ. Since G is acyclic and H is consistent and CDRF, by Lemma 15 the
path T DEP≠≠æú T Õ can be reduced to T RTfitxDEP≠≠≠≠≠≠æú T Õ. Since GÕ only extends G, the same path
is present in GÕ too. Then T Õ txDEP≠≠≠≠æT RTfitxDEP≠≠≠≠≠≠æú T Õ is a cycle over transactions in GÕ, which
contradicts (H Õ, GÕ) œ INV1. We now consider the case when ‹ is a non-transactional access
n. Since G is acyclic and H is consistent and CDRF, by Lemma 16 there exist T Õ and nÕ
such that T txDEP≠≠≠≠æú T Õ PO≠≠æ nÕ CL≠æú n holds in G. Note that T is an uncompleted transaction,
since it currently performs a graph update. Therefore, T txDEP≠≠≠≠æú T Õ PO≠≠æ nÕ CL≠æú n is a
contradiction to (H,G) œ INV2. J
8 The Cost of Privatization-Safety
We now present a result about the inherent cost of privatization-safety, by which we mean
guaranteeing strongly atomic semantics to TDRF programs. In addition to TM histories, we
consider the prefix-closed set of all TM executions X , ranged over by Ï. Unlike histories,
they include internal TM actions that only occur in transactions and are not a part of the
TM interface. One type of an internal action are write-backs of the form (a, t,wb(x, v)),
where a œ ActionId, t œ ThreadID, x œ Reg, and v œ Z. A write-back denotes a transaction
of a thread t writing a value v to a register x. We assume that a TM implementation is
represented by a pair (H,X ) of a set of histories and a set of executions producing them.
I Definition 23. A TM system (H,X ) is progressive when for any Ï œ X with at most one
uncompleted transaction T , if the last interface action by T in Ï is a request –, there exists a
sequence of internal TM actions ÏÕ by T and a response –Õ matching – such that ÏÏÕ–Õ œ X .
I Definition 24. A TM system (H,X ) has invisible reads when for any ÏÏÕ œ X such that Ï
contains at most one uncompleted transaction T and ÏÕ is a sequence of actions corresponding
to another uncompleted transaction T Õ only conflicting with reads by T , if the last interface
action by T Õ is a request –, there exists a sequence of internal TM actions ÏÕÕ by T Õ and a
response –Õ ”= (_,_, aborted) matching – such that ÏÏÕÏÕÕ–Õ œ X .
Our progressiveness property is analogous to obstruction-freedom [22], requiring a trans-
action to complete when running solo. Our invisible reads property can be ensured when the
TM only writes to thread-local memory upon reading [21]. The FencedTL2 TM from §7 is
privatization-safe and has invisible reads, but is not progressive due to its use of fences. As
the following theorem shows, this is not accidental.
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I Theorem 25. A TM system that guarantees strongly atomic semantics to TDRF programs
cannot both be progressive and have invisible reads.
We rely on the following proposition, proved in §F.
I Proposition 26. Consider a TM system that guarantees strongly atomic semantics to
TDRF programs. If Ï is a TM execution of a single atomic block where the latter com-
mits, and (_,_,write(x, v)) is its last write request to x, then Ï also contains a write-back
(_,_,wb(x, v)), and all write-backs to x occur in Ï after the first write request to x.
Proof of Theorem 25. The proof is by contradiction. Assume there exists a progressive
TM (H,X ) with invisible reads that guarantees strong atomicity to every TDRF program
P , so that JP K(H) ∞ JP K(Hatomic). We choose a particular TDRF program P and construct
a counterexample trace from JP K(H) that does not have a matching trace in JP K(Hatomic).
Namely, we consider the following program P , similar to the one in Figure 1:
{ priv = false · x = 0 }
l1 = atomic {
priv = true; } //T1
if (l1 == committed)
l2 = x; //n
atomic {
if (!priv)
x = 42;
} //T2
We first consider a single-threaded program executing the atomic block in the right-hand-
side thread t2 of P . The TM always allows the program to execute requests (§2), and the
invisible reads property ensures that the TM responds to them without aborting. Therefore,
there is an execution Ï02 œ X consisting only of actions of the atomic block of t2 in P ending
with a commit-response. By Proposition 26, the execution of Ï02 contains a write-back
(_, t2,wb(x, 42)). Let Ï2 be the prefix of Ï02 until the first write-back w = (_, t2,wb(x, 42)).
By Proposition 26, Ï2 contains a write request to x and, therefore, a preceding response
(_, t2, ret(false)) to a read from priv. The set of TM executions is prefix-closed, so Ï2w œ X .
Note that Ï2 corresponds to a (partial) trace of P . We now let P continue Ï2 by executing
the atomic block of the left-hand-side thread t1. The TM always allows t1 to execute requests
(§2), and the invisible reads property ensures that the TM responds to them without aborting,
as they only conflict with t2’s read from priv in Ï2. We thus obtain a sequence of actions
Ï1 corresponding to a committed transaction T1 such that Ï2Ï1 œ X . We can then execute
n = (_, t1, read(x))(_, t1, ret(0)), which returns the initial value of x as there has not been
any write-back to x yet. We thereby obtain an execution Ï2Ï1n œ X in which thread t1 of
P has executed to completion.
We now let P resume executing the atomic block of thread t2. Since the TM is progressive,
the execution Ï2Ï1n can be extended to an execution Ï = Ï2Ï1nÏÕ2 œ X where the atomic
block is completed, yielding a transaction T2. We first consider the case when T2 commits in
Ï. The execution Ï corresponds to a trace · œ JP K(H). Since JP K(H) ∞ JP K(Hatomic), there
exists a trace · Õ œ JP K(Hatomic) matching · . Above we established that Ï2 reads false from
priv and, hence, so does T2. To justify reading this value in · Õ, T2 must commit in this
trace before T1 starts and, therefore, before n starts too. Hence, n must observe T2’s write
to x in · Õ, even though it observes the initial value in · . Then · Õ cannot match · , and this
contradiction concludes the proof.
We now consider the case when T2 aborts in Ï. Above we established that Ï02 = Ï2w_ œ
X , so that Ï2w œ X . Since the TM executes write-backs as atomic writes, if a transaction is
interrupted when a write-back w is pending, it proceeds with w once its execution resumes.
Hence, it must be the case that ÏÕ2 takes the form of wÏÕÕ2 , so that Ï = Ï2Ï1nwÏÕÕ2 . Since
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the TM does not impose restrictions on the placement of the non-transactional accesses (§2),
it must also allow an execution Ï2Ï1wnÕÏÕÕ2 œ X , where nÕ = (_, t1, read(x))(_, t1, ret(42))
returns the value written by w. This execution corresponds to a trace · œ JP K(H). SinceJP K(H) ∞ JP K(Hatomic), there exists a trace · Õ œ JP K(Hatomic) matching · . In this trace nÕ
reads 42 written by an aborted transaction T2, which cannot happen under Hatomic. Hence,
· Õ ”œ JP K(Hatomic), and this contradiction concludes the proof. J
9 Related Work and Discussion
We have previously proposed a notion of DRF for privatization-unsafe TMs and a correspond-
ing variant of opacity that ensure the Fundamental Property [26]. This work considered
a more low-level programming model, which required inserting fences after some of the
transactions for a program to be DRF. The resulting DRF notion was thus more involved
than TDRF. Showing that the simpler TDRF is enough for privatization-safe TMs required
us to address new technical challenges, such as the need to generalize TDRF to concurrent
histories (to formulate privatization-safe opacity, §4) and to prove the delicate path reduction
lemmas linking TDRF with properties of opacity graphs (§6). Furthermore, unlike [26], our
results are also applicable to TMs that achieve privatization-safety by means other than
fences, such as a lock-based TM we handle in §E.2. Our results also suggest a strengthening
of those in [26]; we defer the details to §G.
The notion of TDRF we use is a variant of the one proposed by Dalessandro et al. [11].
They also suggested that the notion should satisfy the Fundamental Property, but with strict
serializability as the required condition on the TM. As we argued in §4, this condition is too
strong, as it does not allow the proofs of TM correctness to benefit from the DRF of programs
using it. In this paper we justify the appropriateness of TDRF by proposing a matching TM
correctness condition that enables proofs of common TMs and proving the Fundamental
Property for it. This also requires us to generalize TDRF to concurrent histories.
In this paper we assumed sequential consistency as a baseline non-transactional memory
model. However, transactions are being integrated into languages, such as C++, that have
weaker memory models [1]. Transactional sequential consistency, which we use as our strongly
atomic semantics, is equivalent to that prescribed by the C++ memory model without relaxed
transactions or non-SC atomics [9], and our definition of a data race is given in the axiomatic
style used in the C++ memory model [2]. Hence, we believe that in the future our results
can be generalized to the wider C++ model, in particular, by weakening the client order in
Definition 2 to account for non-SC non-transactional accesses.
Abadi et al. also proposed disciplines for privatization with a formal justification of their
safety [3, 4]. However, these disciplines are more restrictive than ours: they either prohibit
mixing transactional and non-transactional accesses to the same register [4] or require explicit
commands to privatize and publish an object [3]. Such disciplines are particular ways of
achieving the more general notion of TDRF that we adopted.
Attiya and Hillel [7] investigated the cost of privatization in progressive TMs. Unlike
us, they considered support for privatization to be part of TM interface and did not rely
on a formal notion of privatization-safety. They proved the impossibility of supporting
privatization in eager TMs, and a lower bound on its implementation cost in lazy TMs. Our
Theorem 25 unifies and strengthens their results, as it states the impossibility of providing
privatization-safety for all progressive TMs with invisible reads. We also make the results
more rigorous by linking them to a formal notion of privatization-safety based on TDRF.
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A Additional Details for §2: Programming Language Semantics
A.1 Formal Definition of Well-formed Traces
To formalize restrictions on accesses to variables by primitive commands, we partition the
set PCom into m classes: PCom = vmt=1 LPcommt. The intention is that commands from
LPcommt can access only the local variables of thread t (LVart). To ensure that in our
programming language a thread t does not access local variables of other threads, we require
that the thread cannot mention such variables in the conditions of if and while commands
and can only use primitive commands from LPcommt.
I Definition 27. A trace · is a finite sequence of actions satisfying the following well-
formedness conditions:
1. every action in · has a unique identifier: if · = ·1 (a1,_,_) ·2 (a2,_,_) ·3 then a1 ”= a2;
2. commands in actions executed by a thread t do not access local variables of other threads
tÕ ”= t: if · = _ (_, t, c)_ then c œ LPcommt;
3. for every thread t, the projection · |t of · onto the actions by t cannot contain a request
action immediately followed by a primitive action: if · |t = _–1–2_ and –1 is a request
then –2 is a response;
4. request and response actions are properly matched: for every thread t, history(·)|t consists
of alternating request and corresponding response actions, starting from a request action;
5. actions denoting the beginning and end of transactions are properly matched: for every
thread t, in the projection of · |t to begintx, committed and aborted actions, begintx
alternates with committed or aborted, starting from begintx;
6. non-transactional accesses execute atomically: if · = ·1 – ·2, where – is a read or a write
request action by thread t, and all the transactions of t in ·1 completed, then ·2 begins
with a response to –.
7. non-transactional accesses never abort: if · = _–1 –2 ·2, where –1 is a non-transactional
request action then –2 is not an aborted action.
A.2 Formal Definition of the Programming Language Semantics
The semantics of the programming language is the set of traces that computations of programs
produce. We first describe its high-level structure, and then present its formalization.
A state of a program P = C1 Î . . . Î CN records the values of all its variables: s œ
State = (vNt=1 LVart) æ Z. The semantics of a program P is given by the set of tracesJP,HK(s) ™ Traces it produces when executed with a TM H from an initial state s. To define
this set, we first define the set of traces JP K(s) ™ Traces that a program can produce when
executed from s with the behavior of the TM unrestricted, i.e., considering all possible values
the TM can return on reads and allowing transactions to commit or abort arbitrarily. This
definition follows the intuitive semantics of our programming language. We then restrict JP K(s)
to the set of traces produced by P when executed withH by selecting those traces that interact
with the TM in a way consistent with H: JP,HK(s) = {· | · œ JP K(s) · history(·) œ H},
where history(·) projects to interface actions.
We now formally define the set JP K(s). It is computed in two stages. First, we compute
a set A(P ) of traces that resolves all issues regarding sequential control flow and interleaving.
Intuitively, if one thinks of each thread Ct in P as a control-flow graph, then A(P ) contains
all possible interleavings of paths in the graphs of Ct, t œ ThreadID starting from their initial
nodes. The set A(P ) is a superset of all the traces that can actually be executed: e.g., if a
thread executes the command “x := 1; if (x = 1) y := 1 else y := 2” where x, y are local
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variables, then A(P ) will contain a trace where y := 2 is executed instead of y := 1. To filter
out such nonsensical traces, we evaluate every trace to determine whether it is valid, i.e.,
whether its control flow is consistent with the e ect of its actions on program variables. This
is formalized by a function eval : State◊ Tracesæ P(State) fi { } that, given an initial state
and a trace, produces the set of states resulting from executing the actions in the trace, an
empty set if the trace is invalid, or a special state  if the trace contains a fault action.
Thus, JP K(s) = {· œ A(P ) | eval(s, ·) ”= ÿ}.
When defining the semantics, we encode the evaluation of conditions in if and while
statements with assume commands. More specifically, we expect that the sets LPcommt
contain special primitive commands assume(b), where b is a Boolean expression over local
variables of thread t, defining the condition. We state their semantics formally below;
informally, assume(b) does nothing if b holds in the current program state, and stops the
computation otherwise. Thus, it allows the computation to proceed only if b holds. The
assume commands are only used in defining the semantics of the programming language;
hence, we forbid threads from using them directly.
The trace set A(P ). The function AÕ(·) in Figure 4 maps commands and programs to
sequences of actions they may produce. Technically, AÕ(·) might contain sequences that are
not traces, e.g., because they do not have unique identifiers or continue beyond a fault
command. This is resolved by intersecting the set AÕ(P ) with the set of all traces to define
A(P ). AÕ(C)t gives the set of action sequences produced by a command C when it is executed
by thread t. To define AÕ(P ), we first compute the set of all the interleavings of action
sequences produced by the threads constituting P . Formally, · œ interleave(·1, . . . , ·m) if
and only if every action in · is performed by some thread t œ {1, . . . ,m}, and · |t = ·t for
every thread t œ {1, . . . ,m}. We then let AÕ(P ) be the set of all prefixes of the resulting
sequences which respect Definition 27, as denoted by the prefix operator. We take prefix
closure here (while respecting the atomicity of non transactional access) to account for
incomplete program computations as well as those in which the scheduler preempts a thread
forever.
AÕ(c)t returns a singleton set with the action corresponding to the primitive command
c (primitive commands execute atomically). AÕ(C1;C2)t concatenates all possible action
sequences corresponding to C1 with those corresponding to C2. The set of action sequences
of a conditional considers cases where either branch is taken. We record the decision using an
assume action; at the evaluation stage, this allows us to ensure that this decision is consistent
with the program state. The set of action sequences for a loop is defined by considering all
possible unfoldings of the loop body. Again, we record branching decisions using assume
actions.
The set of action sequences of read and write accesses includes both sequences where
the access executes successfully and where the current transaction is aborted. The former set
is constructed by nondeterministically choosing an integers v to describe the the return and
parameter for the read and write accesses, respectively. To ensure that e indeed evaluates
to v, in the case of a write, Note that some of the choices here might not be feasible: the
chosen v might not be the value of the parameter expression e when the method is invoked.
Such infeasible choices are filtered out at the following stages of the semantics definition: the
former in the definition of JP K(s) by the use of evaluation and the semantics of assume, and
the latter in the definition of JP K(H, s) by selecting the sequences from JP K(s) that interact
with the transactional memory correctly. The set of action sequences of x := atomic {C}
contains those in which C is aborted in the middle of its execution (at an object operation or
right after it begins) and those in which C executes until completion and then the transaction
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commits or aborts.
Semantics of primitive commands. To define evaluation, we assume a semantics of every
command c œ PCom, given by a function JcK that defines how the program state is transformed
by executing c. As we noted before, di erent classes of primitive commands are supposed to
access only certain subsets of variables. To ensure that this is indeed the case, we define JcK
as a function of only those variables that c is allowed to access. Namely, the semantics of
c œ LPcommt is given by
JcK : (LVart æ Z)æ P(LVart æ Z).
Note that we allow c to be non-deterministic.
For a valuation q of variables that c is allowed to access, JcK(q) yields the set of their
valuations that can be obtained by executing c from a state with variable values q. For
example, an assignment command l := lÕ has the following semantics:
Jl := lÕK(q) = {q[l ‘æ q(lÕ)]}.
We define the semantics of assume commands following the informal explanation given at
the beginning of this section: for example,
Jassume(l = v)K(q) = I{q}, if q(l) = v;ÿ, otherwise. (1)
Thus, when the condition in assume does not hold of q, the command stops the computation
by not producing any output.
We lift functions JcK to full states by keeping the variables that c is not allowed to access
unmodified and producing  if c faults. For example, if c œ LPcommt, then
JcK(s) = {s|LVar\LVart ‡ q | q œ JcK(s|LVart)},
where s|V is the restriction of s to variables in V . (For simplicity, we assume commands to
not fault.)
Trace evaluation. Using the semantics of primitive commands, we first define the evaluation
of a single action on a given state:
eval : State◊ Actionæ P(State)
eval(s, (_, t, c)) = JcK(s);
eval(s,Â) = {s}.
Note that this does not change the state s as a result of TM interface, since their return
values are assigned to local variables by separate actions introduced when generating A(P ).
We then lift eval to traces as follows:
eval : State◊ Tracesæ P(State)
eval(s, ·) =
I
ÿ, if · = · ÕÏ · eval(s, · Õ) = ÿ;
evalna(s, · |¬abortact), otherwise,
where · |¬abortact denotes the trace obtained from · by removing all actions inside aborted
transactions, and
evalna(s, ·) =
I
{s}, if · = Á;
{sÕÕ œ eval(sÕ,Ï) | sÕ œ evalna(s, · Õ)}, if · = · ÕÏ.
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The set of states resulting from evaluating trace · from state s is e ectively computed by
the helper function evalna(s, ·), which ignores actions inside aborted transactions to model
local variable roll-back. However, ignoring the contents of aborted transactions completely
poses a risk that we might consider traces including sequences of actions inside aborted
transactions that yield an empty set of states. To mitigate this, eval(s, ·) recursively evaluates
every prefix of · , thus ensuring that sequences of actions inside aborted transaction are valid.
Recall that we define JP K(s) as the set of those traces from A(P ) that can be evaluated
from s without getting stuck, as formalized by eval. Note that this definition enables
the semantics of assume defined by (1) to filter out traces that make branching decisions
inconsistent with the program state. For example, consider again the program “l := 1; if (l =
1) lÕ := 1 else lÕ := 2”. The set A(P ) includes traces where both branches are explored.
However, due to the semantics of the assume actions added to the traces according to
Figure 4, only the trace executing lÕ := 1 will result in a nonempty set of final states after
the evaluation and, therefore, only this trace will be included into JP K(s).
A.3 The Atomic TM
We define an idealized atomic TM Hatomic where the execution of transactions does not
interleave with that of other transactions or with non-transactional accesses. By instantiating
the semantics of JP,HK(s) with this TM, we formalize the strongly atomic semantics [8]
(transactional sequential consistency [11]).
The atomic TM Hatomic contains only histories that are non-interleaved, i.e., where
actions by one transaction do not overlap with the actions of another transaction or of
non-transactional accesses. Note that by definition actions pertaining to di erent non-
transactional accesses cannot interleave. Note also that transactions in a non-interleaved
history do not have to be complete, because they may be produced by programs in our
language, e.g., due to a non-terminating loop inside an atomic block. For example,
H0 = (_, t1, begintx)(_, t1, ok)(_, t1,write(x, 1))(_, t1, ret(‹))(_, t1, trycommit)
(_, t2, begintx)(_, t2, ok)(_, t2,write(x, 2))(_, t3, read(x))(_, t3, ret(1))
is non-interleaved. We have to allow such histories in Hatomic, because they may be produced
by programs in our language, e.g., due to a non-terminating loop inside an atomic block.
We define Hatomic in such a way that the changes made by a live or aborted transaction
are invisible to other transactions. However, there is no such certainty in the treatment of a
commit-pending transaction: the TM implementation might have already reached a point
at which it is decided that the transaction will commit. Then the transaction is e ectively
committed, and its operations may a ect other transactions [21]. To account for this, when
defining Hatomic we consider every possible completion of each commit-pending transaction
in a history to either committed or an aborted one. Formally, we say that a history Hc is a
completion of a non-interleaved history H if:
1. Hc is non-interleaved;
2. Hc is has no commit-pending transactions;
3. H is a subsequence of Hc; and
4. any action in Hc which is not in H is either a committed or an aborted action.
For example, we can obtain a completion of history H0 above by inserting (_, t1, committed)
after (_, t1, trycommit).
We define Hatomic as the set of all non-interleaved histories H, in which every transaction
can be completed that have a completion Hc where every response action of a read(x) returns
the value v in the last preceding write(x, v) action that is not located in an aborted or live
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transaction di erent from the one of the read; if there is no such write, the read should return
the initial value vinit. For example, H0 œ Hatomic. Hence, Hatomic defines the intuitive atomic
semantics of transactions.
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B Additional Details for §3: Examples of Privatization
{ x_is_ready = false · x = 0 }
l1 = atomic {
x = 42;
} //T
x_is_ready = true; //n
do {
l2 = x_is_ready; //nÕ
} while (¬l2);
l3 = x; //nÕÕ
{ l1 = committed =∆ l3 = 42 }
Figure 5 Privatization by agreement outside transactions.
{ priv = false · x = 0 }
atomic {
priv = true;
} //T1
l1 = atomic {
l2 = priv;
} //T2
if (l1==committed · l2)
x = 1; //n
atomic {
if (¬priv)
x = 42;
} //T3
{ l1 = committed · l2 =∆ x = 1 }
Figure 6 Proxy privatization.
Figure 5 gives an example of a program that privatizes an object by agreeing on its status
outside transactions (“partitioning by consensus” in [34]). The left-hand-side thread writes to
x inside a transaction and then sets the flag x_is_ready outside. The right-hand-side thread
keeps reading the flag non-transactionally until it is set, and then reads x non-transactionally.
Since the program is TDRF, we expect the postcondition shown to hold: . This program
is TDRF because, in any of its traces under Hatomic, the conflicting write in T and the
non-transactional read nÕÕ are ordered in happens-before due to the client order between the
write in n and the read in nÕ that causes the do loop to terminate. Since the program is
TDRF, we expect the postcondition shown to hold.
Figure 6 gives an example of proxy privatization [36]. Analogously to the example from
Figure 1, an object x is guarded by a flag priv, showing whether the object should be accessed
transactionally (false) or non-transactionally (true). The left-hand-side thread first tries
to set the flag inside transaction T1. The middle and the right-hand-side threads both
check the flag priv prior to accessing x, non-transactionally and transactionally, respectively.
This program is TDRF because, in any of its traces under Hatomic, the non-transactional
write n and the conflicting write in T3 are ordered in happens-before. Indeed, in every
corresponding trace under Hatomic, T3 executes before T1 to justify reading priv being false,
and T1 executes before T2 to enable the condition for the subsequent non-transactional access
n. Since the program is TDRF, we expect the postcondition shown to hold.
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C Additional Details for §4: Proof of Lemma 7
We use some some of auxiliary lemmas, adapted from [6]. The following lemma shows that a
trace ·H with a history H can be transformed into an equivalent trace ·S with a history S
that is in the opacity relation with H.
I Lemma 28.
’H,S œ History. H ı S =∆ (’·H . history(·H) = H =∆ ÷·S . history(·S) = S · ·H ≥ ·S).
We also rely on the following proposition that allows us to conclude that the trace ·S
resulting from the rearrangement in Lemma 28 can be produced by a program P if so can
the original trace ·H .
I Proposition 29. If ·H œ JP K(s) and ·H ≥ ·S, then ·S œ JP K(s).
Proof of Lemma 7. Let us consider any program P and assume that TDRF(P ) holds. By
Definition 3, we have:
’· œ JP K(Hatomic).TDRF(history(·)).
We consider any trace ·H œ JP K(H) and its history H = history(·H). We also consider
any history S œ Hatomic such that H ı S holds. By Lemma 28, there exists ·S such that
history(·S) = S and ·H ≥ ·S . By Proposition 29, ·S œ JP K(s) holds. Moreover, since
history(·S) = S œ Hatomic, it is in fact the case that ·S œ JP K(Hatomic, s).
Since the program P is TDRF, histories of every trace from JP K(Hatomic) are TDRF too.
In particular, TDRF(S) holds, which allows us to state the following:
’S. S œ Hatomic ·H ı S =∆ TDRF(S).
Hence, CDRF(H) holds by Definition 5. Overall, for every trace ·H œ JP K(H, s) we proved
that CDRF(history(·H)) holds. The latter allows us to conclude that CDRF(P,H) holds.
J
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D Additional Details for §6: Proving Privatization-Safe Opacity
D.1 Consistent Histories
I Definition 30. A pair of matching request and response actions (–,–Õ) is local to a given
transaction T from a history H, if:
– = (_,_, read(x)) · ÷— œ T.— <po(H) – · — = (_,_,write(x,_)); or
– = (_,_,write(x,_)) · ÷— œ T.– <po(H) — · — = (_,_,write(x,_)).
We let local(H) denote the set of all local actions in H.
I Definition 31. We say that a pair (–,–Õ) is a well-formed read from x œ Reg in a history
H, written wfWR(H,x)(–,–Õ), if – = (_,_,write(x, v)), –Õ = (_,_, ret(v)) and the matching
request action for –Õ is (_,_, read(x)).
I Definition 32. In a history H, a read request – = (_,_, read(x)) and its matching response
–Õ = (_,_, ret(v)) are consistent, if:
when (–,–Õ) œ local(H) and performed by a transaction T , v is the value written by the
most recent write (_,_,write(x, v)) preceding the read in T ;
when (–,–Õ) /œ local(H), either there exists a non-local — not located in an aborted or live
transaction such that wfWR(H,x)(—,–Õ) holds, or there is no such — and v = vinit.
Also, a history H is consistent, written cons(H), if all of its matching read requests and
responses are.
D.2 Proof of Proposition 18
We only prove the part 1, as part 2 can be proven analogously. Let HBk(H) , (PO(H) fi
CL(H)fiEF(H))k and let  (k) denote the following statement: if T <HBk(H) n, then there are
T Õ and nÕ such that T ÆEF(H) T Õ <PO(H) nÕ ÆCL(H) n. We prove (’k Ø 1. (k)) by induction
on k.
The base of the induction,  (1), is when T <HB1(H) n holds. Out of relations in HB1(H),
only PO(H) can relate a transaction and a non-transactional access, meaning that T <PO(H) n
is the case. Hence, there exist T Õ = T and nÕ = n such that T ÆEF(H) T Õ <PO(H) nÕ ÆCL(H) n.
For the induction step, we consider k > 1 and assume that  (kÕ) holds of each kÕ such
that 1 Æ kÕ Æ k ≠ 1. Let us assume that T <HBk(H) n holds too. By definition of HBk(H),
one of the following is the case:
1. there exists T ÕÕ such that T <HB1(H) T ÕÕ <HBk≠1(H) n, or
2. there exists nÕÕ such that T <HB1(H) nÕÕ <HBk≠1(H) n.
In the first case, applying the induction hypothesis  (k ≠ 1) to T ÕÕ <HBk≠1(H) n immediately
concludes the proof. In the second case, by definition of CL, nÕÕ <CL(H) n holds. Therefore,
T <HB2(H) n holds, so we can apply the induction hypothesis  (2) to conclude the proof. J
D.3 Proof of Theorem 20
I Proposition 33. If a strict partial order R ™ Y ◊Y is acyclic and sets X,Z ™ Y are such
that:
y /œ X and y /œ Z,
’x œ X.¬(y R≠æú x),
’z œ Z.¬(z R≠æú y), and
’x œ X, z œ Z.¬(z R≠æú x),
then R fi {(x, y) | x œ X} fi {(y, z) | z œ Z} is acyclic.
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Proof. We prove the proposition in two steps. First, we prove acyclicity of R1 , Rfi{(x, y) |
x œ X}, and then of R2 , R1 fi {(y, z) | z œ Z}.
We prove acyclicity of R1 by contradiction. Since R is acyclic, a cycle in R1 must involve
at least one new edge. Let x œ X be such that x R1≠≠æ y R1≠≠æú x. However, y R≠æú x does not
hold by the premise of the proposition. Therefore, y R1≠≠æú x must also involve new edges.
Let xÕ be the element involved in the last of such edges:
x
R1≠≠æ y R1≠≠æú xÕ R1≠≠æ y R≠æú x.
We arrived to a contradiction to ¬(y R≠æú x).
We now prove acyclicity of R2. Let us show that the following holds:
’z œ Z.¬(z R1≠≠æú y). (2)
We do that by contradiction. Let us assume there is z œ Z such that z R1≠≠æú y. By the
premise of the proposition, z R≠æú y does not hold, so at least one new edge of R1 must
participate in z R1≠≠æú y. However, since all such edges end in y and R1 is acyclic, it can
only be that for some x œ X, z R≠æú x R1≠≠æ y holds. The latter contradicts the premise of the
proposition. Therefore, (2) holds. This observation enables demonstrating acyclicity of R2
analogously to the first step of the proof. J
In the following lemma, we denote the set of non-transactional accesses in V by nontxn(V)
and range over them by n. We also let txns(V) be the set of transactions in V.
I Lemma 34. Consider an acyclic opacity graph G = (V, vis,WR,WW,RW,PO,CL) of a
consistent CDRF history H. For any conflicting non-transactional access n and a transaction
T , either n DEP≠≠æú T or T DEP≠≠æú n holds.
Proof. Let us consider any conflicting non-transactional access n and a transaction T . We
prove the lemma by contradiction. We assume that the following holds in the graph G:
¬(n DEP≠≠æú T ‚ T DEP≠≠æú n), (3)
and show that this assumption contradicts CDRF of H.
We represent the set of linearizations of G, lins(G), as a disjoint union of two sets: L1,
the set of all linearizations of G, in which T occurs before n, and L2, all other linearizations
of G. We then let A1 and A2 denote the following sets of transactions:
A1 , {T1 | ÷L1, n1. L1 œ L1 · n1 œ nontxn(V) · T ÆEF(L1) T1 <PO(L1) n1 ÆCL(L1) n};
A2 , {T2 | ÷L2, n2. L2 œ L2 · n2 œ nontxn(V) · n ÆCL(L2) n2 <PO(L2) T2 ÆEF(L2) T}.
With the help of Proposition 33, we demonstrate that history H has a linearization
in which every T1 œ A1 occurs before T and every T2 œ A2 occurs after T . Consider any
T1 œ A1 and T2 œ A2. By the definition of T1 œ A1, there exist L1 œ L1 and n1 œ nontxn(V)
such that T1 <PO(L1) n1 ÆCL(L1) n. By Definition 12 of opacity graphs, T1 DEP≠≠æú n holds of
G. Analogously, n DEP≠≠æú T2 holds. Since G is acyclic and T1 DEP≠≠æú T2 holds, we can conclude
the following:
’T1 œ A1, T2 œ A2.¬(T2 DEP≠≠æú T1). (4)
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By assumption (3), neither T DEP≠≠æú n nor n DEP≠≠æú T holds. Therefore, T œ A1, T œ A2,
T
DEP≠≠æú T1 and T2 DEP≠≠æú T do not hold either (otherwise, T DEP≠≠æú n and n DEP≠≠æú T would
be implied by transitivity). Overall, we have shown:
’T1 œ A1.¬(T DEP≠≠æú T1);
’T2 œ A2.¬(T2 DEP≠≠æú T ).
(5)
By Proposition 33, (4) and (5) imply that the graph G has a linearization in which every
T1 œ A1 occurs before T and every T2 œ A2 occurs after T .
In the rest of the proof, we consider a linearization L œ lins(G), in which every T1 œ A1
occurs before T and every T2 œ A2 occurs after T . History H is consistent and its opacity
graph G is acyclic. By Lemma 13, L œ lins(G) ™ Hatomic holds. Moreover, H is CDRF,
meaning that the conflicting pair of T and n must be ordered by HB(L), that is, either
T <HB(L) n or n <HB(L) T holds. By Proposition 18, T <HB(L) n holds only if there exist T1
and n1 such that:
T ÆEF(L) T1 <PO(L) n1 ÆCL(L) n. (6)
Let us assume that such T1 and n1 exist. Then T ÆEF(L) T1 holds. However, it is the case
that T1 œ A1, and T1 ÆEF(L) T must hold by construction of L. We arrived to a contradiction,
meaning that there are no T1 and n1 satisfying (6). We conclude that n <HB(L) T does not
hold, and, analogously, we can show that T <HB(L) n does not hold either. Overall, we have
found a linearization L of a CDRF history H such that TDRF does not hold of L. We have
arrived to a contradiction with CDRF of H. J
By combining Lemmas 16 and 34, we get
I Corollary 35. Consider an acyclic opacity graph G = (V, vis,WR,WW,RW,PO,CL) of a
consistent CDRF history H. For any conflicting non-transactional access n and a transaction
T , either n txDEPfiRTfiPOfiCL≠≠≠≠≠≠≠≠≠≠≠≠æ+ T or T txDEPfiRTfiPOfiCL≠≠≠≠≠≠≠≠≠≠≠≠æ+ n holds.
Proof of Theorem 20. The “if” case is covered by Corollary 35, so here we prove the “only
if” case. Let us consider any L œ Hatomic such that H ı L. According to the definition
of Hatomic (§A.3), L has a non-interleaved completion LÕ. We construct an opacity graph
GÕ = (V, vis,WR,WW,RW,PO,CL) based on L and LÕ as follows:
V is the set of all transactions and non-transactional accesses in L.
vis is the set of committed transactions and all non-transactional accesses in LÕ.
For each x œ Reg, we let ‹ WRx≠≠≠æ ‹Õ if ‹Õ reads from x and ‹ is the <L-last out of visible
vertexes writing to x and preceding ‹Õ.
For each x œ Reg, we let WWx be the order in which visible vertexes writing to x occur
in L.
We derive PO and CL from L, and RW from WR and WW.
It is easy to show that G œ Graph(H). Therefore, by the premise of the theorem, between
every conflicting pair of a transaction T and a non-transactional access n there is a path
in (txDEP fi RT fi PO fi CL)+. Note that whenever T1 txDEPfiRT≠≠≠≠≠≠æ T2, T1 <EF(L) T2 holds.
Consequently, T and n are ordered by <HB(L). Overall, we have shown:
’L. (H ı L · L œ Hatomic) =∆ TDRF(L),
which allows us to conclude CDRF(H). J
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E Additional Details for §7: Case Studies
E.1 FencedTL2
In §7, as a part of the proof of Theorem 21 we showed that acyclicity of opacity graphs is
invariant under the graph update txread(T, x). We now give details for the other graph
updates. Note that for the pseudo-code of TL2, we refer to [26, §C.1].
We make the following observation about the graph updates in FencedTL2: both trans-
actional and non-transactional reads return the value of the most recent write to the object.
Based on that, we state the following proposition.
I Proposition 36. The graph updates txread(‹, x) and ntxread(‹, x) do not add edges
of the form ‹ RWx≠≠≠æ_.
The proposition holds trivially of non-transactional reads. For txread(T, x), we note that
at the moment of the graph update adding a read dependency ‹ WRx≠≠≠æ T , ‹ can be shown
to be the most recent write to x (this proof is a part of proving the usual opacity of TL2).
Adding a read dependency on the most recent write does not induce anti-dependencies by
Definition 12 of RW.
I Lemma 37. Let (H Õ, GÕ) be the result of performing an update txinit(T ), ntxread(n, x)
or ntxwrite(n, x) on (H,G). Assume that (H,G), (H Õ, GÕ) œ INV and G is acyclic. Then
GÕ is acyclic too.
Proof. The graph event txinit(T ) does not invalidate acyclicity of the graph, because it
only adds a new vertex into the graph and orders it after some of the existing vertexes. This
vertex does not have outgoing edges, so it cannot take part in a cycle.
The graph events ntxread(n, x) and ntxwrite(n, x) do not invalidate acyclicity of the
graph either. They only add edges ending in the vertex n, i.e., they do not add edges of the
form n DEP≠≠æ _. Also, upon the execution of these graph events, n is a new vertex in the
graph, and it does not have outgoing edges. Therefore, n cannot take part in a cycle. J
I Lemma 38. Let (H Õ, GÕ) be the result of performing an update txread(T, x) on (H,G).
Assume that (H,G), (H Õ, GÕ) œ INV1 · INV2 and G is acyclic. Then GÕ is acyclic too.
Proof. By contrapositive: we assume that GÕ contains a simple cycle and show that GÕ
violates either INV1 or INV2. The graph update adds an edge of the form _ WRx≠≠≠æT . Consider
a simple cycle involving the new edge ‹ WRx≠≠≠æ T for some vertex ‹. By our assumption, there
must be a reverse path T DEP≠≠æú ‹ in G. Let us first consider the case when ‹ is a transaction
T Õ. Since G is acyclic and H is consistent and CDRF, by Lemma 15 the path T DEP≠≠æú T Õ
can be reduced to T RTfitxDEP≠≠≠≠≠≠æú T Õ. Since GÕ only extends G, the same path is present in
GÕ too. Then T Õ txDEP≠≠≠≠æ T RTfitxDEP≠≠≠≠≠≠æú T Õ is a cycle over transactions in GÕ, which contradicts
(H Õ, GÕ) œ INV1.
We now consider the case when ‹ is a non-transactional access n. Since G is acyclic
and H is consistent and CDRF, by Lemma 16 there exist T Õ and nÕ such that T txDEP≠≠≠≠æú
T Õ PO≠≠æ nÕ CL≠æú n holds of G. Note that T is an uncompleted transaction, since it currently
performs a graph update. Therefore, T txDEP≠≠≠≠æú T Õ PO≠≠æ nÕ CL≠æú n is a contradiction to
(H,G) œ INV2.
J
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E.2 Two-Phase Locking TM
In this section, we consider a two-phase locking TM system [21], which we call 2PL. This TM
assumes a try-lock for every register in memory, and synchronizes transactional accesses to the
registers according to the two-phase locking protocol. 2PL also maintains transaction-local
read- and write-sets similarly to other TMs. To perform a transactional read from a register
x in a transaction T , 2PL first checks if x is in either read- or write-set of T , in which case
T returns the previously read or written value accordingly, and otherwise T attempts to
acquire a lock on x. After having successfully acquired the latter, T reads the value of x
from memory and adds a corresponding record into the read-set. To perform a transactional
write to a register x in a transaction T , 2PL first checks x is not in the write-set of T yet, in
which case T tries to acquire a lock on x, modifies the register in memory and stores a record
in the write-set (together with the original value of x). If T already has x in its write-set,
the transaction simply writes to memory. To commit a transaction, 2PL simply releases all
the locks it has acquired, and to abort one, 2PL first rolls back the updates to registers by
writing back to memory their original values as stored in the write-set, and then releases the
locks.
To prove privatization-safe opacity of 2PL, for every one of its executions we inductively
construct an opacity graph matching its history with the help of the following graph updates,
which specify how and when in the execution to extend the graph:
At the start of a transaction T , a graph update txinit(T ) adds a new vertex T and
extends the real-time order with edges T Õ RT≠≠æ T for every completed transaction T Õ.
At the end of a read operation of a transaction T reading from an object x, a graph
update txread(T, x) adds a read dependency ‹ WRx≠≠≠æT , where ‹ is the vertex that wrote
the value returned by the read.
Upon starting the commit of a transaction T , a graph update txwrite(T, x) adds a
write dependency ‹ WWx≠≠≠æ T for every object x in the write-set of T , where ‹ is the vertex
that wrote the previous value of x.
Upon each non-transactional write n to an object x, a graph update ntxwrite(n, x)
adds a new vertex n and a write-dependency ‹ WWx≠≠≠æ n, where ‹ is the vertex that wrote
the previous value of x.
Upon each non-transactional read n from an object x, a graph update ntxread(n, x)
adds a new vertex n and a read dependency ‹ WRx≠≠≠æ n, where ‹ is the vertex that wrote
the value returned by n.
The updates also add anti-dependencies of the form _ RW≠≠æ T induced by new read- and
write-dependencies.
At each step of the graph construction we prove that the graph remains acyclic. Then
Theorem 14 guarantees that the history of the execution is opaque. We use Lemmas 15
and 16 to reduce the task of proving the graph acyclicity to proving the absence of cycles
involving transactions only.
We establish the following invariants over pairs (H,G) of a history H and a graph G:
INV1. H is a consistent history and the relation txDEP fi RT is acyclic.
To enable the reduction from privatization-safe to plain opacity, we prove the following
invariant, which states the guarantee provided by the two-phase locking protocol in 2PL:
INV2. For every uncompleted transaction T such that its last action in H is a response,
and a transaction T Õ, T txDEP≠≠≠≠æ T Õ does not hold.
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An informal justification of the invariant is as follows. By construction of the graph it is
possible to establish that a dependency T txDEP≠≠≠≠æT Õ can only be added by txread(T Õ,_) and
txwrite(T Õ,_). However, to perform those updates, T Õ first needs to acquire corresponding
locks, which T holds until it starts committing or aborting. In both cases, the last action by
T in the history H would need to be a request (either for an operation or a commit).
By Theorem 14, privatization-safe opacity of 2PL follows from the following theorem.
I Theorem 39. ’H œ 2PL.CDRF(H) =∆ ÷G. (H,G) œ INV1 · INV2 · acyclic(G).
We prove Theorem 39 by induction on the length of the TM execution inducing H, con-
structing G as described above and showing that it remains acyclic after each update with
the aid of the two invariants. In this section we only explain how we prove acyclicity in the
case of graph update txread txwrite, which illustrates the use of Lemmas 15 and 16.
I Lemma 40. When (s,H,G) œ INV and (sÕ, H Õ, GÕ) is the result of executing txinit(T ),
ntxread(n, x) and ntxwrite(n, x), the graph GÕ is acyclic.
Let (H Õ, GÕ) be the result of performing an update txinit(T ), ntxread(n, x) or
ntxwrite(n, x) on (H,G). Assume that (H,G), (H Õ, GÕ) œ INV and G is acyclic. Then GÕ
is acyclic too.
Proof. The graph event txinit(T ) does not invalidate acyclicity of the graph, because it
only adds a new vertex into the graph and orders it after some of the existing vertexes. This
vertex does not have outgoing edges, so it cannot take part in a cycle.
The graph events ntxread(n, x) and ntxwrite(n, x) do not invalidate acyclicity of the
graph either. They only add edges ending in the vertex n, i.e., they do not add edges of the
form n DEP≠≠æ _. Also, upon the execution of these graph events, n is a new vertex in the
graph, and it does not have outgoing edges. Therefore, n cannot take part in a cycle. J
The following proposition states a simple property of 2PL, which allows us to conclude
that the graph updates of a vertex ‹ only add edges ordering ‹ after other vertexes.
I Proposition 41. The graph updates txread(‹, x) and ntxread(‹, x) do not add edges
of the form ‹ RWx≠≠≠æ_.
The proposition can be proven inductively based on the observation that reads always return
values written by most recent writes.
I Lemma 42. Let (H Õ, GÕ) be the result of performing an update txwrite(T, x) on (H,G).
Assume that (H,G), (H Õ, GÕ) œ INV and G is acyclic. Then GÕ is acyclic too.
Proof. By contrapositive: we assume that GÕ contains a simple cycle and show that GÕ
violates INV. The graph update only adds edges of the form _ DEPx≠≠≠æ T (in particular,
Proposition 41 rules out a possibility of new anti-dependencies). Since all new edges end
in the same vertex T , they cannot occur in the same simple cycle. Hence, we can consider
them separately.
Consider a simple cycle involving a new edge ‹ DEP≠≠æ T for some vertex ‹. By our
assumption, there must be a reverse path T DEP≠≠æú ‹ in G. Let ‹Õ be the first action on
the path after T . Note that T is an uncompleted transaction in (H,G), since it currently
performs a graph update, and the last action by T in H is a response.
Thus, if ‹Õ is some transaction T Õ, we obtain a contradiction to INV2. Let us now consider
the case when ‹Õ is a non-transactional access n. Since G is acyclic and H is consistent
and CDRF, and the edge T DEP≠≠æú ‹ is in G, by Lemma 16 there exist T Õ and nÕ such that
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T
txDEP≠≠≠≠æú T Õ PO≠≠æ nÕ CL≠æú n holds of G. However, as we showed before, if T if followed by a
transaction in GÕ, we obtain a contradiction to (H Õ, GÕ) œ INV2. J
I Lemma 43. Let (H Õ, GÕ) be the result of performing an update txread(T, x) on (H,G).
Assume that (H,G), (H Õ, GÕ) œ INV and G is acyclic. Then GÕ is acyclic too.
Proof. By contrapositive: we assume that GÕ contains a simple cycle and show that GÕ
violates INV. The graph update only adds edges of the form _ DEPx≠≠≠æ T (in particular,
Proposition 41 rules out a possibility of new anti-dependencies). Since all new edges end
in the same vertex T , they cannot occur in the same simple cycle. Hence, we can consider
them separately.
Consider a simple cycle involving a new edge ‹ DEPx≠≠≠æ T for some vertex ‹. By our
assumption, there must be a reverse path T DEP≠≠æú ‹ in GÕ. Let ‹Õ be the first action on the
path after T . Note that T is an uncompleted transaction, since it currently performs a graph
update, and whose last action in H Õ is a read response. Thus, if ‹Õ is some transaction T Õ, we
obtain a contradiction to INV2. Let us now consider the case when ‹Õ is a non-transactional
access n. The edge T DEP≠≠æú ‹ must be present in G as well as in GÕ, as it is not added by the
current graph update txread(T, x). Since G is acyclic and H is consistent and CDRF, by
Lemma 16 there exist T Õ and nÕ such that T txDEP≠≠≠≠æú T Õ PO≠≠æ nÕ CL≠æú n holds of G. As graph
updates only add new edges and vertexes, and never remove the existing ones, it must be
the case that T txDEP≠≠≠≠æú T Õ holds of GÕ too. However, as we showed before, if T if followed by
a transaction in GÕ, we obtain a contradiction to (H Õ, GÕ) œ INV2. J
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F Additional Details for §8: Proof of Proposition 26
Consider a TM system that guarantees strongly atomic semantics to TDRF programs, and a
TM execution Ï of a single atomic block where the latter commits. Let (_,_,write(x, v)) be
its last write request to x. We first prove that Ï also contains a write-back (_,_,wb(x, v)).
Note that Ï is also a prefix of an execution of a program consisting only of the same atomic
block followed by a non-transactional read from x, which is trivially TDRF. Since the TM
guarantees strongly atomic semantics to this program, the read must return v, and therefore,
the execution of Ï must contain a write-back (_,_,wb(x, v)).
We now prove that all write-backs to x occur in Ï after the first write request to x. Let
us assume that is not the case. Let w = (_,_,wb(x, vÕ)) be the first write-back to x, and
let ÏÕw be the corresponding prefix of Ï. In the following, we do a case split depending on
whether vÕ = vinit.
We first consider the case when v = vinit. It is easy to see that ÏÕw is also a prefix of an
execution of a program that runs a modification of the original atomic block where every
write to x is replaced by skip (a primitive command that never changes the state) in parallel
with a non-transactional write to x of vÕÕ ”= vinit followed by a non-transactional read from x:
{ x = vinit }
atomic { ... } //T x = vÕÕ; //n
l = x; //nÕ
This program is trivially TDRF. Since the TM does not impose restrictions on the placement
of non-transactional accesses (§2), ÏÕnwnÕ, where n is a non-transactional write of vÕÕ to x
and nÕ is a non-transactional read of vinit from x, is an execution of the above program. But
this execution contradicts the fact that the TM guarantees strongly atomic semantics to this
program, since the semantics requires the read to return vÕÕ. This contradiction shows the
required.
We now return to the case when vÕ ”= vinit. It is easy to see that ÏÕw is also a prefix of an
execution of a program that runs a modification of the original atomic block where every write
to x is replaced by skip in parallel with a non-transactional read from x. This program is
trivially TDRF. The TM system cannot prevent programs from executing non-transactional
operations in threads with no active transactions (§2), so the program can continue ÏÕw by
executing the non-transactional read from x, which has to return the value vÕ written by w.
But the resulting execution contradicts the fact that the TM guarantees strongly atomic
semantics to this program, since the semantics requires the read to return vinit ”= vÕ . This
contradiction shows the required. J
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G Additional Details for §9: DRF for Privatization-Unsafe TMs
Since TMs such as TL2 can be made privatization-safe by conservatively inserting fences
after each transaction, one might ask whether our DRF notion could be derived from the
one we proposed previously [26] by specializing it to this fence placement. However, this
is not the case. The reason is that one of the relations included into the happens-before
of [26] (used to handle publication) is smaller than necessary. By changing the relation to
incorporate an analog of the e ect order, we can obtain a notion of DRF that does specialize
to TDRF when fences are placed after each transaction; the techniques from this paper can
be used to strengthen the theorems of [26] to handle the improved DRF. In the following, we
present our improvement of the notion of data-race freedom from [26].
We assume that the set of interface actions includes a request (a, t, fbegin) and a response
(a, t, fend) (where a œ ActionId and t œ ThreadID). The actions fbegin and fend denote the
beginning and, respectively, the end of the execution of a fence command.
A data race happens between a pair of conflicting actions, as defined in §3. For such actions
to form a data race, they should be concurrent. We formalize this using a happens-before
relation fhb(H) on actions in a history H.
For a history H, we define several relations over actions of H, which we explain in the
following:
restricted per-thread order xpo(H): – <xpo(H) –Õ i  – <H –Õ, actions – and –Õ are by the
same thread t, and there is a (_, t, begintx) action between – and –Õ.
after-fence order afs(H): – <afs(H) –Õ i  – <H –Õ, – = (_,_, fbegin) and
–Õ = (_,_, begintx), i.e., the transaction begins after the fence does (Figure 7(a)).
before-fence order bfe(H): – <bfe(H) –Õ i  – <H –Õ,
– œ {(_,_, committed), (_,_, aborted)} and –Õ = (_,_, fend), i.e., the transaction ends
before the fence does (Figure 7(b)).
I Definition 44. For a history H we let the happens-before relation of H be
fhb(H) = (po(H) fi cl(H) fi afs(H) fi bfe(H) fi (xpo(H) ; ef(H)))+.
I Definition 45. A history H is data-race free (DRF), written DRF(H), if for every history
S œ Hatomic such that H ı S, fhb(S) relates every conflict in H.
I Definition 46. A program P is data-race free (DRF) when executed from a state s with a
TM H, written DRF(P,H), if ’· œ JP K(H, s).DRF(history(·)).
We have xpo(H) ; ef(H) ™ fhb(H). Intuitively, this is because, if we have (–,–Õ) œ ef(H),
then the commands by the thread of – preceding the transaction of – are guaranteed to have
taken e ect by the time –Õ executes. This ensures that publication can be done safely, as
we now illustrate by showing that the program in Figure 2 is DRF under Hatomic. Traces
of the program may have only a single pair of conflicting actions—the accesses to x in n
and T2. Recall that, under Hatomic, transactions do not interleave with other transactions or
non-transactional accesses. Hence, for both conflicting actions to occur, T1 should execute
before T2, yielding a history of the form nT1T2. In this history, we have a e ect order
between the write to x_is_private in T1 and the read from x_is_private in T2. But then
the write to x in n happens-before the read from x in T2, so that these actions cannot form
a race.
Relations afs(H) and bfe(H) are used to formalize synchronization ensured by transac-
tional fences. Recall that a fence blocks until all active transactions complete, by either
committing or aborting. Hence, every transaction either begins after the fence does (and
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Figure 7 An illustration of the fence relations.
thus the fence does not need to wait for it; Figure 7(a)) or ends (including any required
clean-up) before the fence does (Figure 7(b)). The relations afs(H) and bfe(H) capture the
two respective cases. Note that, as required by the semantics of fences, every transaction has
to be related to a fence at least by one of the two relations: a transaction may not span a
fence.
Including after-fence and before-fence relations into happens-before ensures that privatiza-
tion can be done safely given an appropriate placement of fences. To illustrate this, we show
that the program in Figure 1 are DRF under Hatomic when we place a transactional fence
between T1 and n. The possible conflicts are between the accesses to x in n and T2. For a
conflict to occur, T2 should execute before T1, yielding a history H of the form T2T1–1–2n,
where –1 and –2 denote the request and the response actions of the fence. Since T2 occurs
before –2 in the history, they are related by the before-fence relation. But then the accesses
to x in T2 happen-before the write in n and, therefore, the conflicting actions do not form a
race. Finally, the program in Figure 3 is racy, since its traces contain pairs of conflicting
actions unordered in happens-before.
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